Net offi cial development assistance (ODA) from the 22 DAC member countries has increased to over $100 billion over the last two years, with a promise of increases of 30 percent over the next three years.
Most ODA is for special purpose needs which do not translate into funds available for development projects and programs. Developing country governments are only receiving about $38 billion in net country programmable aid (CPA).
Sub-Saharan Africa is especially hard hit by this wedge between ODA and CPA. It only received $12.1 billion in CPA in 2005, showing almost no increase over the preceding two decades.
Non-DAC bilateral assistance (NDBA) is growing rapidly and amounts to more than $8 billion in ODA and $5 billion annually in CPA.
Private aid (PrA) from DAC member countries might already contribute between $58-68 billion per year, although aggregate data is sketchy. 
Key trends in aid architecture
Multilateral aid agencies (around 230) outnumber donors and recipients combined.
Multilaterals only disburse 12 percent of total aid (offi cial plus private), and about one-quarter of total net CPA.
Multilaterals disburse more towards Africa than do bilaterals.
The average number of donors per country is growing, while average project size appears to be shrinking, implying growing fragmentation of aid.
Key Issues
Mechanisms for information sharing, coordination, planning and aid administration are increasingly costly and ineffective.
There is a growing need for effi cient allocation rules for donors to fund the growing number of aid agencies, but assessments of aid agency effectiveness is in its infancy.
Scaling up, learning and innovation could advance as new players experiment with new methods, but would require more public and private sector exchanges. The most pressing challenge of development, the effort to raise incomes of the poorest countries in subSaharan Africa (SSA), has hardly seen any funding increase at all. Astonishingly, our estimates suggest that only $12.1 billion of the overall offi cial development assistance takes the form of funds that SSA countries can use to invest in social and infrastructural development programs. This is almost the same as the amount received by these countries twenty years ago in 1985, in constant dollar terms. In terms of donor GDP or per capita support for recipient countries, the amounts now going for long-term development in SSA have declined steadily for a generation.
This note documents the trends in aid that have led to this result. It shows the growing reluctance of rich countries to funnel their assistance in the form of program or project support to developing countries. It shows that although the number of multilateral agencies has grown dramatically over time, the share of aid passing through these channels has shrunk. It shows the growth in the number of specialized agencies, each focusing on narrow developmental issues at the expense of broader, more comprehensive strategies.
And fi nally it shows that increases in aid are more likely to come from non-DAC bilateral donors, NGOs and new corporate philanthropists than through traditional channels.
Section II of this note describes a general framework of aid fl ows, followed by a discussion on trends in the volume of net aid fl ows in Section III. Section IV looks at the changing aid architecture. Section V concludes with issues for discussion.
A FRAMEWORK FOR AID
T he traditional aid framework connects three channels. Citizens in rich countries pay taxes to their governments, some of which are used for development assistance. These rich country governments on-lend or grant money to poor country governments, who in turn implement programs and policies designed to accelerate development and reduce poverty. The framework works well when the public in rich countries is willing to have tax revenues spent on aid, when rich country governments have confi dence in poor country governments to develop appropriate projects and programs and when poor country governments have the capacity to implement these programs so as to generate the desired developmental results.
During the Marshall Plan, which remains the best example of external, offi cial aid success, the channels were simple and effective. There was great public support for helping Europe get back on its feet. A single major donor, the USA, provided funds to a small number of countries whose economies had been destroyed by the war. The focus was on reconstruction, implying that development projects were easily identifi able. Planning and implementation skills in recipient countries were strong.
A more complex picture emerged when efforts were reoriented towards development of poor countries. 1 In addition, the multilateral aid mobilization framework provided for effective "burden sharing" among donors, which contributed to a sense of fairness, a spirit of competition among donors in replenishment rounds and thus also contributed to raising the general willingness to pay.
This basic system, illustrated in Figure 1, Offi cial aid channels are also facing sustained criticism for favoring political ends rather than development concerns in the allocation of funds across countries, 3 and for failing to deliver results in many cases. These trends have stoked skepticism about the effectiveness of offi cial aid. They also undermine the ability of rich country governments to mobilize new funds for development: contemporary increases in ODA are leveraged from special use funds (which generally fl ow back to rich countries) and not from increases in real resource transfers. In several rich countries, the willingness to have governments intermediate foreign assistance has shrunk. Government, in both rich and poor countries, is seen by many as a source of problems rather than as a solution to problems of poverty.
In response, the aid architecture is changing rapidly.
Citizens in rich countries are increasingly looking to channel their funds through private organizations, rather than through governments. Importantly, there still appears to be a signifi cant degree of support for the concept of foreign aid among the world's rich countries. In a recent survey, 90 percent of respondents in France, Germany and Great Britain, and 84 The DAC also reports on other offi cial fl ows, such as financing from offi cial export credit agencies, but these fl ows are non-concessional and hence not included in the analysis of aid. Most non-concessional development bank fi nancing also falls into this category.
These fl ows are supposed to be commercial and so do not require tax-payer support, beyond the contributions made to the equity of the development agency (which is included as aid). They are today dominated in size by fl ows from private commercial sources.
Net aid fl ows-the aggregates At fi rst blush, the trends in net aid seem to be consistent with donor commitments but the devil lies in the details, as shown below.
Net aid transfers into country programmable aid (CPA)
Not all the funds counted as aid are actual fl ows that can be applied to development projects and programs in poor countries. To measure country programmable aid (CPA), we subtract from total aid the special purpose fl ows: administrative costs of aid agencies, humanitarian and emergency relief, food aid, technical cooperation and debt relief (on private credits and non-aid offi cial fi nancial fl ows). This is not to argue that these forms of assistance are unimportant or of no value. Rather it simply asserts that these kinds of transfers cannot be used directly for development programs like building and maintaining schools, clinics and infrastructure. Most of sub-Saharan Africa's money for development projects came from multilateral agencies ($7.9 billion).
They provided almost half their net development aid the EC and the vertical funds, which now account for one-half the multilateral system, also comes through.
What is more striking, however, is the decline in the share of IDA and the regional banks, from 57 percent of net multilateral CPA in 1995 to 36 percent in 2005.
IDA and the regional banks tend to be the agencies with the closest relationships to country development agencies, and tend to have the strongest fi eld presence. The implication, therefore, is that the largest, fastest growing multilateral agencies (the vertical funds) are the least well equipped to share information, coordinate with government programs in the field and respond flexibly to new development demands because they are specifi c-purpose and with centrally-designed and run programs.
Non-DAC aid donors
The mixed record of ODA, in terms of how much is actually delivered to poor country governments to meet pressing development needs, has created space that has been quickly taken over by two new groups of 
Extrapolated from US fi gures. Lower bound assumes US private aid represents 58% of total (OECD/DAC). Upper bound assumes US private aid represents 49% of total (Salamon, L., 2007). 7. Index of Global Philanthropy (2007). 8. International relief NGOs accounted for 36% of international nonprofi t sector revnues. Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006). 9. 11% of international nonprofi ts' expenditures oriented to adminstration and fundraising. Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006).

AID ARCHITECTURE Changes in aid architecture
The description above of trends in aid fl ows suggests that the simple aid architecture, summarized in Figure   1 , has changed. As in the past, money still fl ows (even- The results of constructing a HHI for aid are presented in Table 3 . The fi gures shown are weighted averages of individual country HHI levels, with the weights being the share of each country in the ODA of that group. They show that the HHI is getting smaller over time (more fragmentation); that it is smaller for Africa and larger for Oceania; and that it is smaller for poorer countries.
These trends can be formalized in a regression model (Table 4) The unfortunate conclusion is that the countries experiencing the greatest amount of fragmentation-small, There is more promise in efforts being made at a national level, and to some degree at the level of existing institutions such as the EC. But at a minimum, the proliferation of new aid agency creation should be halted until there is better understanding, based on solid research, of the implications for the system as a whole.
The challenge of harmonization can be seen by looking at the correlation matrix of each donor's allocation of aid across countries (Table 5 ). If donors gave money to the same recipients, then it might be easier to harmonize their strategies as it would suggest that donor interests are aligned. We report on major bilateral and major mul- Correlations among European countries and Canada tend to be higher than with the United States. The implication of this is that donor interests appear to diverge from each other. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a proliferation of new agencies. Each serves as a conduit for a unique combination of donor preferences on a specifi c topic. But without greater uniformity in donor interests, with some subsidiarity to broad development goals, the prospects for effective harmonization are not good.
Results, effectiveness, and allocation rules
Results measurement for development is in its initial Table 6 . Table 6 shows that both total aid and CPA are much more volatile than national income. It also shows that volatility has risen since 1990, compared to the two preceding decades.
Results, and attribution to specifi c agencies, should be a critical element in the allocation rule for a bilateral
donor. An effi cient aid allocation system would be one where more effective agencies receive greater alloca- Another important avenue for research is on the "need" side. Efforts to cost the MDGs are one approach, but require detailed country case studies which are hard to aggregate. An alternative approach is to estimate the size of the poverty gap for each country -the amount it would take to lift every individual above a given poverty line. Country "need" can be considered as proportional to the country poverty gap.
Scaling up, learning and innovation
The aid effectiveness literature fi nds mixed evidence of the impact of aid on broad aggregates such as country growth. Aid proponents sometimes argue that this is because aid fl ows have been so modest that it is unreasonable to expect them to have economy-wide impact. But those arguments belie ample evidence that in certain instances programs can be taken to scale with limited resources. In a more fragmented world, understanding the obstacles to scaling up becomes ever more important.
One challenge with scaling up is that programs might achieve narrowly defi ned objectives but not contrib- A better mechanism for information sharing, planning and coordination, perhaps through a new technological platform. This may also need to be complemented by new codes of conduct for private aid donors and implementers to ensure that they work within the system and not at odds with the system. It could also result in a better division of labor between offi cial agencies.
A revised approach towards the allocation of aid by donors that is based on the effectiveness of the development contribution, not on the politics, voting shares, or philosophy of the agency.
A focus on scaling up where proven solutions have already been demonstrated. There may be some exceptions to this. For example, some food aid is monetized by selling food in local markets, with the proceeds used for development projects. But these numbers are small compared to the aggregates discussed above. We also deduct interest received by donors from total aid to get net development aid.
plying that the US is 58.5 percent of the global total.
Kerlin and Thanasombat (2006) However, there is little evidence at this point that rich individuals in poor countries disburse their gifts to countries other than their own.
